In this paper, we examine the historical development 
and experience conditions of high stress with low self-esteem and little hope of finding a better solution to a pressing problem than that favored by the leader or inf-luential menbers.
When present, these antecedent conditions are hypothesized to foster the extreme consensus-seeking characteristic of groupthink. This in tr.trn is predicted to lead to two categories of undesirable decision-making processes. The t'irst, traditionally labeled symptoms of groupthink, include ilh.rsion of invulnerability, collective rationalization, stereotypes of outgroups, self-censorship, mindguards. and belief in the inherent morality of the group. The second, typically identitiecl as symptoms of det'ective decision-making, involve the inconrplete survey ofalternatives and objectives, poor information search, failure to appraise the risks of the preferred soh"rtion, and selective information processing. Not surprisingly, these combined fbrces are predicted to result in extrenrely det'ective decision making performance by the group.
The range of the groupthink theory is breathtaking. Groupthink is one of the few social science models that has had a truly interdisciplinary impact. (Cline, 1994) , the Carter Administration's decision to use military measures to rescue lranian hostages (Ridgeway, 1983; Smith, 1984) , and the South Moluccan hostage taking (Rosenthal & t Hart, 1989 (Feynman, 1985 Esser, 1984; Courtwright, 1978; Flowers, 1977; Leana,1985) . Archival research (e.g., Raven ,l9l4; Tetlock, 1979; Esser & Lindoerfer, 1989; Hensley & Griffin, 1986) Fodor and Smith (1982) examined the effbcts of power motivation on groupthink ontcomes. Kroon and colleagues (Kroon, t Hart, & van Kreveld, 1991;  Kroon, van Kreveld, & Rabbie, 1992) investigated the effects of accountability and gender on groupthink, whereas Kameda and Sugimori (1993) Tetlock (1979) and J anis (1972, 1982) Raven, 1974;  Longley & Pruitt, 1980; t Hart, 1998 ; for reviews see Aldag & Fuller, 1993;  Esser 1998, Park, 1990) . Other studies suggest that groupthink is not apparent when even most of the antecedents conditions exist (e.g., Neck & Moorhead, 1992 Marriott,&Esser, 1985; Flowers,l977; Leana,1985) .Thus,whenlaboratory experiments find evidence for groupthink, it tends tobe partial-for example, finding that directive leadership does limit discussion but that this does not interact with cohesion and ultimately does not affect other decision processes.
Moreover, both laboratory and case research provide conflicting findings regarding the adequacy of conceptualizations of antecedents. For example, laboratory experiments as well as analyses of both the Nixon White House (Raven , 1974) and the Challenger space shuttle decision (Esser & Lindoerfer, 1989) found little evidence for the traditional conception of cohesion as mutual attraction (see Callaway & Esser, 1984; Callaway et al., 1985; Flowers, 1977 Fodor & Smith, 1982; Leana, 1985 Leana, 1985) .
Seconcl, few experimental studies have documented the end result and the hallnrark of groupthink: the low quality, defective decisions. For example, studies investigating the etl'ects of cohesion and leadership style show no adverse etfects on performance (Flowers, 19111Fodor & Smith, 1982i Leana, 1985 .
Studies investigating the effects of social cohesion and discussion procedures (e.g., restricted vs. participatory discttssion) similarly provide no evidence of impaired decision performance under groupthink conditions (Callaway & Esser, 1984; Callaway et aL., 1985; Courtwright, 1978 Greenwald and Ronis (1981) term the disconfirmation dilemma. ln short. is the failure to completely replicate the groupthink etfect a result of poor theoretical specitications. poor research design, or a combination of both?
Not surprisingly, taken together, these findings have fbstered a variety of evaluations regarding the viability of the groupthink theory. These opinions range from outright rejection to reconceptualization ofkey antecedents to revitalizing the concept to meet the requirements of current situations. The papers in this volume reflect these diverse perspectives. It is our hope that the papers in this volume will serve both to document the very real contributions of the groupthink model as well as its limitations and to stimulate further research on the topic so that the concurrence-seeking that is the hallmark of groupthink becomes a phenomenon that is understood rather than emulated.
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